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I. 
WHAT'S BEHIND THE WALL? 
At first sight the Berlin wall can throw Ithe ,American tourist 
off the track. If he is interested in learning the truth about the 
recurrent "crises" over Berlin he'll have Ito do more than just look. 
And these days there is compelling reason why every American 
should be keenly interested. If the recent Cuban crisis brought us 
all face.to.face vtith the peril of a world nuclear catastrophe, the 
Berlin question is potentially far more explosive. At the same 
time, the resolution of the most threatening aspects of the Cuban 
crisis revived the opportunity as well as the urgent necessity for 
action in respect to Berlin. It is now' not only absolutely manda· 
tory but also entirely feasible to settle peacefully and honorably . 
this inflammatory problem, so sternly sYlnbolized by the Berlin 
,vall. 
The wall is merely a concrete barrier topped by barbed wire. It 
was erected on August 13, 1961 by the East Berlin government 
along the already existing frontier between the two secitons of 
Berlin. 
Probably it's .the barbed wire that gives it its formidable ap-
pearance. Add to that the tank barriers erected at the checkpoints 
which control the entrances and exits of traffic be~ween the two 
sections, and the East German frontier guards, young men who 
stand facing the West with legs apart and autoluatic rifles always 
at the ready. 
It's a pr~tty grim affair and an Amerioan peering at it from 
West Berlin and relying solely on eye-witness impressions is apt to 
draw some hard and fast-and absolutely wrong-conclusions. 
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To understand Ithe wall and vvhat it symbolizes, to relate it 'to the 
real causes of tension in Berlin and the real source of danger to the 
American people, we had to do a lot of looking and listening on 
both sides of Ithe wall and a lot of mulling over whaat we'd seen 
and heard. We also had to do some toug.h hO'm-e--work in history, 
past as well as recent, but after much thought and study we felt 
reasonably 'confident 'we had found t:!he morsel of truth at the source 
of ,the sparks which threaten any day to' blow up into a conflagra-
tion that can also ,consume America. Knowing where the sparks 
O'riginate may help av.ert the explosion. 
The first thing Americans need to know about Berlin is that it 
is German, not American. 
Like the rest of Germany, Berlin is divided into an eastern and 
a western part. But both parts are 120 miles inside ithe former 
Soviet occupation zone which is now the German Democratic Re-
public (GDR). A glance at the map will show that Berlin lies 
closer to Poland than to the former Anglo-American-Fren'ch occu-
pa:tion zones, which now constitute the Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG). 
Americans may travel freely in both German states and in both 
sections of Berlin. A passport is sufficient for 'the FRG and for 
West and E'ast IB·erlin. For travel through the rest of the G·DR a 
v.isa is required. 
But the average American, looking at the two German states, 
is side..ltracked from the very beginning. OUT newspaapers and 
newscasts and commentators, in their vast majority, as well as 
our government, and its various departments and agencies, are 
frank about their bias. So ,t:!hat the American visitor, his head 
crammed with this bias and with canned interpretations of events 
in BerHn and the two Gerlnanys, ·cannot but approach the wall 
with a -closed n1ind. A look at the wall is supposed to fix in-
delibly and irrevocably all those preconceptions. It is supposed to 
be final and conclusive proof of the judgments already made for 
him. How is he to know that it should actually be only the 
beginning of his investigation? Look.ing a!t it from the West Berlin 
side, where -the aut:horities have helpfully erected platforms for the 
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edification of tourists, most Americans are easily persuaded that the 
wall is incontrovertible evidence of "Communist aggress·iveness 
.and injustice." 
Even if not already so. persuaded, Americans find West Berlin 
-beyond which many never travel eastward-teeming with "per-
.suaders." Tha·t section of the city is virtually crammed with slick, 
'!\Tell-groomed young men and ·chic young women with nice eyes 
who are eager to discuss the "menace of Bolshevism" in cafes, 
.hotel lobbies, or cozier quarters. There are other helpful sources 
of "information"-ordinary West Berlin shopkeepers and workers 
intent on exploiting whatever adVlantage can he derived from tell-
ing A'mericans what they believe Americans want to hear; per-
sonnel of NATO occupation forces, glibly repeating the catch-
phrases of their indoctrination; and, of course, the 'tVest Berlin 
police, those "absolute auth9rities" on the statistics of ",Com-
munist aggression." 
Then there are the WeS't Berlin newspapers and radio news-
casts. Even Americans accustomed to war scares and jingoist 
hysteria in our information media think the "Vest Berlin agencies 
lay it on too thick. Tales of horror and brutality in East Berlin 
are contrasted to the "freedom" and "happiness" of West Ber-
liners. Harsh and obscene epithets are freely hurled at the leaders 
of the GDR. The favored taliget is Walter U1bricht, chairman of 
the GDR Council of lVlinisters and first secretary of the Socialist 
Unity Party . . He is charaoterized as everything odious under ,the 
sun, but never what his life-long record shows-a German who 
never faltered in oppo.sing militarists, junkers, money-kings and 
reactionary politicians who 'repeatedly dragged his country and his 
people into disaster. 
Another, more insidious way of influencing the visiting Ameri-
can has been made possible through' the thoughtfulness of our own 
businessmen. The American need not trouble to hring anything 
with hi;m to West Berrl.in. He will ·find virtually every art,icle of 
necessity in West Berlin shops---4American-made as well as West 
German products and those from other NA.TO countries. Don't 
underestimate the feeling of "all's right with the world" which 
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comes with finding a newspaper from home in the hotel lobby 
or the corner newsstand. ,Or the availability of A'mellican cigar-
ettes and American liquors, of American automobiles and Ameri-
can-style night clubs with the added attraction of German and 
European performers in ever-so-exotic atmospheres, of American 
jazz every minute of the day and night if one desires itI In such 
circumstances it is not too diffi,cult to feel that West B'erlin is not so 
different from home, and then to lapse into forgetting that it 
acually is not home. 
None of this is to be found in East Berlin. True enough, an 
East German, Chinese, Czech, Soviet or Hungarian article is gen-
erally no worse, sometimes better, than its American-m,ade counter-
part. And consumer goods made .in the GD'R and other socialist 
countries are plentiful in East Berlin stores. But these goods are 
strange to the American. And the very absence of the familiar 
American name-brand favorites, although it may seem an insigni-
ficant thing, helps West Berlin propaganda sell the idea that every-
thing in the East is strange, alien-and hostile. 
Open, active and aggressive persuaders slwarm in the Federal 
Republic. In fact, persuasion of the American is SIQ conspicuous 
a feature of West German behavior that the wonder is more Ameri-
cans don't suspect it is state policy. Yet, if this idea ever crosses 
the Almerican's mind, how is he to put it to ,the test? Whom should 
he ask to verify it? 'Certainly it is extremely unlikely he will me'et 
someone with a different outlook, fur instance, a German peace 
advocate, anti-fascist or Communist, millions of whom live and 
work in the Federal Republic. Americans simply don't move about 
in such circles. Even more improbable is his chance of meetling 
such a person, or any West German for that matter, 'Who will talk 
freely and frankly to an American-conditions being what they are 
under the Bonn government. 
In the atmosphere we found in West 'Germany, it sounded a 
trifle odd to hear a hotel employee in FTankfurt declare that West 
Berlin is "the key to America's survival," our "last outpost" and 
(/'firs't bastion" in Europe, and that if "those East Berli n Com-
munists" are allowed to control the troop and air corridors into 
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West Berlin, American civilization will be placed in mortal 
jeopardy. It also seemed presumptuous for Germans to' lecture us 
about our country's national interests-'though the words and 
arguments were almDst identical to those we've been .reading and 
hearing for years in our own country. And we didn't relish it 
when a 'clerk in a Berlin department store told a cus1tomer stand-
ing alO'ngside us that Hitler had had the .right idea but had merely 
"made mistakes." The concern for American survival and nos-
talgia for Hitler somehow did nDt seem to go together. 
We had a memm-able conversation with an affluent middle-
aged cDuple whO' looked the soul of veracity and ''''ho, with 
nary a smile and in solemn pontifical tones, described to' us in 
detail the massed Soviet rormatiDns we would see on the other 
side of the Berlin wall: tank trDops and tanks, paratroops, atDmic 
guns, missile carriers, et cetera. "YO'u can't see them from West 
Berlin," they said, "but they're in all the side streets of East Ber-
lin. Some of the tanks even keep their motors running around the 
clock!" 
Perhaps most helpful of all was the remark of a chap who 
looked like a banker and talked like a college professDr but who 
was actually a trade union official. He probably wouldn't .~ave 
his job Dr his liberty if his name were known. We can identify 
him only as one of the rare species of Social DemDcratic Party 
officials whO' has managed to' keep both his positiDn and a modi-
cum of dedication to West G rmany's workers. 
To our question regarding the attitude of the West German 
workers toward the Berlin wall, he asked a simple question: "If 
the Communists are bent on attacking us in these days of missiles 
and mobile high-speed offensive arms, why would they build a wall 
around their territory to keep us ou t?" 
We thDught this one over. Yes, a wall is basically defensive and 
protective, like a fence. People don't build fences to' attack their 
neighbors or trespass on their neighbors' property. A wall is in all 
essential purposes a reinforced fence. Is that the function and 
purpose of the Berlin wall? TO' establish the truth about this re-
quired more than a look. 
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Even a look, however, will clear up one matter-there are no 
Soviet fonnations Inassed in East Berlin. We looked high and low 
for them, on main streets .and in side streets. The only Soviet 
military personnel we saw were a couple of officers 'on a shopping 
junket in East Berlin and the soldiers standing guard at the big 
memorial, in West Berlin, to the Soviet troops who fell during the 
Battle of Berlin. 
Soviet troops garrisoned in the coun try are there in accordance 
with the stipulations of the Warsaw Pact, the defense alliance of 
the socialist states, just as Ameri'can, British and French troops 
are garrisoned in the German Federal Republic as stipulated in 
N·AT:O agreements. But this is not the same thing as being massed 
behind the Berlin wall with their tank motors running! Why, 
we asked ourselves, ,,yould that nice old Frankfort couple, with 
such intelligent and honest faces, want us to -think the Soviets 
are poised to attack the West? 
It is a fact that any American can verify with his own eyes 
that the Berlin wall is manned by Germans-citizens and frontier 
guards of the GDR. There are no Soviet troops involved in this 
operation. Nor, for that matter, are Soviet troops involved in the 
administration either of East Berlin or of the GDR. And believe 
it or not, the Soviet commander in the GDR does not have veto 
power over either the East Berlin adminis-tration or the -GDR's 
administration of its frontiers-ex(:ept in relation to the corridors 
fl'om Western Germany to West Berlin, which Soviet troops control 
in keeping vvith an agreement with the GDR. 
This is obviously hard f.or Ameri'cans to believe, since it is con-
trary to everything we have read and heard about Soviet relations 
with the East Germans. It is even harder to believe, since we know 
that the West Berlin administration is under the thumb of com-
manders of the NATO Qccupation trQops. Mayor Willy Brandt is 
compelled ,to' rush to the commanders for their CQnsent on every 
principle issues. Last winter the occupation authorities even re-
jected his request to allow the West German police to help clear 
the snow from the streets. 
Yet, the fact can easily be veri,fied at the wall. I t is Germans 
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who. pDlice and ,oontl:DI the wall, but at the checkpoints it is not 
Germans but NATO trDops who. carry out these functions in West 
Berlin. Thus, at Checkpoint 'Charley, the Friedrichstrasse control 
point bordering on the American oCGupation zone, it is our troops 
who confront the 'Gernlans. 
This is nDt altogether meaningless, especially as it relates to 
the conception so prevalent in our country that "Moscow" and 
"Premier Khrushchev" are trying "to push" us out of West Berlin. 
What you see at the ,vall doesn't lend plausibility to this idea. In 
the first place there are no. Soviet forces there to. do the "pushing" 
even if that were their intention. This.is odd because, as they 
showed during the Battle of Berlin, when push comes to shove, 
the Soviets are adept at both. 1£ "pushing" us out of West Berlin 
were really the Kremlin's aim, why in the world would it take 
measures to reduce Dr eliminate every kind of contact between 
Soviet and A,merican troops, that is, to remove all possfbili ties 
of a clash that could serve as a pretext for "pushing" us out? 
'Some people, like Senal}or Thomas Dodd of Connecticut, have 
a simple explanation for this. He expressed it on Dave Susskind's 
TV show, September 30, 1962. All we have to. do is "be firm" 
with the Soviets, he said, and they'll back down. He documented 
this thesis w.ith the observation that the Soviet had been transport-
ing their guards for the SDviet memorial in West Berlin through 
Chec}(,point Charley. We told them to take another route and they 
did. They'd been using armored cars to transport the guards and 
we told them to quit doing this and they did. Therefore, all we 
have to do is "be firm." 
But the Senator apparently didn't appreciate the fact that the 
Soviet compliance with American requests, far from convincing 
anybody that the Kremlin is intent on "pushing" us out of West 
Berlin, merely shows the Kremlin's inclination to avoid situations 
that could escalate into a development in which real pushing by 
both sides might be unavoidable. The Senator also forgot, or 
seemed to have forgotten, the one case which completely refutes 
his argument. This was the occasion in October, 1961, "vhen 
General Lucius ,Clay ordered American tanks to drive up Fried-
richstrasse and "to hell with the wall." If that is ,the kind of "firm-
ness" Senator Dodd has in mind, it didn't payoff. The Soy.iets 
also drove their tanks up to the wall and theirs outgunned ours. 
The show got Clay more plaudits as a hero and our newspaper 
publishers sold a lot more newspapers, but after you tote up the 
profits and losses, there's nothing whatsoever left to underwrite 
Senator Dodd's prescription for a Berlin settlement. 
On the other hand, what you actually see in Berlin is the total 
absence of any evidence to back the assertion that somebody is 
trying "to push" us out of West Berlim. And if what you see isn't 
enough to convince you, you ought to ponder on what reasons 
could move Khrushchev to try toO eliminate all possibilities of a 
Soviet-American clash by turning over control of even the access 
routes to 'Vest Berlin to Germans-to the GDR authorities. This 
is one of things he wants to achieve through his often-proposed 
peace treaty with the two German states. 
One other aspect of the "aggressive" character of the Berlin 
wall struck us, something w·e'd read about long before we ever 
saw ~he wall. ' We thought it extremely peculiar that an aggressive 
contraption should invariably produce casualties amongst the al-
leged aggressors instead of among the aggressors' targets. We won-
dered why the victims of every incident to date have been East 
German frontier guards or East Berliners-why not a single member 
of the N A T IO occupation forces and not a single person on the 
West Berlin side of the frontier has been a casualty of this wall. 
Unless the East GermalIls are invariably poorer marksmen than 
their West German counterparts, which was a trifle hard to swallow, 
50me other explanation 'was required. 
We went to East Berlin to check on some of these con tradic-
tions. We were able to do so without difficulty. The East Berlin 
authorities were not in the least reluctant to allow us to inspect 
the wall and speak with the frontier guards. We could never have 
imagined the situation was the way we found it. 
II. 
HOW INCIDENTS ARE MADE 
The day we chose to inspect the 'wall was one of mid-July'S 
best-not too warm, not too much sun, just pleasant. We'd have 
preferred to sit at one of .the many sidewalk cafes that dot East 
Berlin's downtown and eat ice cream, or go window-shopping on 
Karl Marx Allee, or even look through some of the new apartlnents 
constantly being built in the GD'R capital. Thanks to prefabrica-
tion and sound budgeting. But our appointment was fixed and 
we were aware that not every American visiting East Berlin has 
the chance to speak with the commander of the GDR's First 
Fron tier Br.igade. 
Lt. Col. Gerhardt Tschichke is 47, a man of medium height, 
very energetic, and quite informal-a far cry from the Prussian 
martinets one expects every German officer to be. He interrupted 
his work and sat at a table with us. We asked about incidents-
how many, where, what, who, with what consequences? 
"The most serious incidents happened in May and June this 
year," he said. "On May 23, Sergeant Peter Goering of our border 
guards was shot and killed. On June 18, Sergeant Reinhold Huhn 
was shot and killed in cold blood by an agent of West German 
groups who had tunneled under the wall to take a group of OUT 
people over to West BeTlin." 
(l~fter returning to the United States 'we learned that a third 
GD·R ci'tizen, Captain Rudi Arnstadt of the People's Anny, had 
been killed on August 14.) 
"Have any West Berlin police or N·ATO forces been killed?" 
we as'ked. 
"Not one. None have even been injured because none of our 
people have ever fired at them. We have strict discipline alTIOng 
our guards." 
He walked to a bulletin board in his office and pulled off a 
document tacked to it. "We have four rules in regard to the use 
of weapons and we require absolute obedience." He laid the order 
on the table and read off the rules. 
"First, no member of the occupation troops must be shot at or 
even aimed at. 
"Second, firing is permitted only when parallel with the frontier, 
never across it. 
"Third, it is absolutely impermissible for children to be aimed 
at-no matter "what ,the circumstances. 
"Fourth, before firing at violators of the frontier or before even 
threatening to fire, every attempt .must be made to arrest thelTI." 
Colonel Tschichke looked up. "Once a month all guards must 
sign documen ts stating that they have been informed of these 
instructions and have obeyed them. They don't have the right to 
use weapons even in self-defense against assault." 
We glanced across the hall at one of the guards who had just 
entered. His automatic rifle hung from his shoulders with its 
muzzle pointed directly forwa·rd and its trigger within instant 
reach of his right hand. This did not seem to fit iill with the 
Colonel's explanation. 
"Why arm these guards with automatic rifles and order them 
to carry them ready for action if they're forbidden to use then1?" 
"They 'will certainly use them when necessary to protect our 
territory and our people," replied the Colonel. ",Certain people 
in West Berlin keep talking about smashing across the frontier 
in fOTce. We want to discourage them from such fool hardly 
action. But if they are not discouraged and persis t, we want to 
be ready to stop them at a moment's notice." 
"Then people can fire at your guards from the West Berlin 
side, but you won't let your guards return the fire? Surely, such 
a set-up is not going to discourage them. On the contrary, it may 
well encourage mor,e provocations on the part of West Berlin." 
"Correct. We do not return their fire. We can say that they 
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have not, at least so faT, tried tQ smash their way through by 
force. Oli the other hand, we have not been able to stop their 
provocations. If we replied to every provocation from West Ber-
lin, we would actually be carrying on a shQoting war." 
He got up again and walked over to a row of files. Returning 
with a folder of documents, he laid them out on the table. 
"Here, take a look at these. They are our monthly records 
of provocations." 
We copied the figures in our notebooks. Here's a summary 
of the record of p~ovocat.ions in Colonel Tschichke's files for 
the period from January I, 1962 to July 15, 1962: 
J ianuary . . .... .. .. .. . . 238 
February .. . ... .. ..... . 231 
March . . . .. .. . .. '. ' . . . . 318 
J\pril . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 32 9 
May .. .. .. . ... .... .. . . 361 
June ... . ..... . . .. . .. . . 357 
July (1-15) ........ . ... 16.5 
The provocations were classified according to type and accord-
ing to the identity of those involved. In the six and one-half 
month's' period, there were: 
443 disturbances and nuisances caused by hurling incendiaries 
in East Berlin buildings, dumping bottles and refuse over the wall, 
shooting OUit window panes with BB guns, and so on; 
86 provocative broadcasts by soundtrucks brought up to the 
wall; 
.135 cases of damage inflicted on the wall; 
202 attempted violations of the frontier from the West by driv-
ing past :contTol officers at the checkpoints, ignoring control offi-
cers and accos ting them, etc. 
622 attempts to' establish contacts with East Berliners; 
6 contacts successfully carried th'fough; 
372 attacks on frontier guards with stones, bottles, etc. 
63 attacks 'On frontier guards with gunfirel 
As to the identify of the provocateurs, this could not be es-
tablished in 118 of the provocations. Of the rest, 718 were com-
mitted by civilians, 589 by West Berlin .police and customs offi-
cials and 494 involved troops of the NAiTO forces. 
Colonel Tschichke pointed out that "each month the provoca-
tions increase a.nd become more serious." He declared that "the 
NATO Jtroops in West Berlin are becoming more aggressive. At-
tempts are increasing to explode hand grenades and plastic bombs 
-like the French ultras. Every day NA TIO troops aim at our 
border guards and pretend to pull the trigger. Sometimes their 
trigger fingers slip." 
He told us these provocations are covered up by the West 
Berlin police, who manufacture stories about incidents in which 
East Berlin guards are alleged to be the aggressors. We did not 
doubt this since almost ,every report in our press of an incident 
in Berlin is issued or "confirmed" by the West Berlin police. 
"Only last night on Heidelberger Strasse, in the American 
sector, youngsters shot at our guards with air rifles," the Colonel 
went on. "They even shot through the open window of a family 
living near the border-a woman w'as hit. Five yards from these 
hoodlums were two West Berlin police who did nothing whatso-
ever to stop it." 
He said this type of provocation is usually a diversion to dis-
tract attention from a more serious incident being carried out 
at some other part of the frontier. "Sure enough, about one 
thousand yards from that place an incendiary was thrown at one 
of our lookout boxes." 
He went to his desk and brought an object wrapped in paper. 
It was a shoe polish can, perforated on top, and 'containing a rag 
soaked in gasoline. 
"Pretty amateurish, something kids would do," he said. "But 
it could have started a fire and destroyed the lookout box." 
Colonel Tschichke gave us pennission to inspect the wall and 
to talk with the frontier g.uards at Checkpoint Charley. Funny 
what a different impression you get from the eastern side of this 
over-sensationalized spot! While we were there a couple of buses 
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full of Danish schoolteachers passed through for a sightseeing 
tour of East Berlin. It was all very routine, like going to Canada 
from Niagara Falls or to Ensenada Beach from San Diego. For 
foreigners there's nothing to it but a display of one's passport. 
The main purpose of the contr()l is to check on East Berliners 
and GDR citizens going to West Berlin, and West Berliners and 
FRG citizens going to East Berlin. For them, a permit is required 
in addition to their passpoot, and application fonns are available 
at the checkpoint. 
But the view from the eastern side of Checkpoint Charley is 
no more edifying than that from the western side. The first thing 
that caught our attention was the gang of West Berlin police and 
tough-looking youths standing on the corner. They were laugh:-
ing and joking, but every pedestrian that passed from one or the 
other direction got a severe going over. They scrutinized him with 
keen attention. 
On the elevated plat£orm a few feet from this gang ·were a 
group of tourists. Two had binoculars, all were staring at the 
GDR frontier guards and watching the processing of traffic 
through the control point. Having already seen what they were 
watching, we know there was nothing to look at but the build-
ings in the background and the traffic. But this seemed to satisfy 
them and a few began unleashing cameras and taking shots of the 
scenery. 
The little house in the center of the street, about 150 yards 
west of the wall, was the U.S. control post. The Stars and Stripes 
fluttered over it and a tall M.P stood at the entrance. A U.S. 
A·rm y official car ,vas parked Ibefore the door. 
I t was a very dull picture and we had to put our ilnagination 
to work in order to figure out why touris,ts came to this spot. 
"Why all the interest over there at this moment?" we asked 
a sergeant of the guards who was showing us the place. 
"They hope something will happen," he replied. 
"Think :they'll get their hope?" 
"One never knows. rrhere are a few more West Berlin police 
and hoodlums than usual. Something could happen any time." 
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He told us he doubted it today, however, because the press 
and propaganda agencies weren't out in force. He said that 
when a provocClJtion was being planned, the West Berlin police 
and the agencies carrying ilt out usually notified the press so as 
to get as much publicity as possible. 
"&ecently a car with a U.S. license drove up to the border," 
the sergeant said. "The passengers got out and placed a fried 
chicken leg across the den1arcation line, that is, in our terr~tory. 
Then they drove off. But we looked up and saw an entire battery 
of cameras in a western observation tower. They were trained 
on the spot where the chicken leg lay. They hoped to photogTaph 
one of our men picking it up. It would have made good propa-
ganda about everybody in the GDR being hungry." 
We left the wall feeling sure about one thing-it was being 
used for purposes of defense. What we had seen and heard pro-
vided no whit of evidence tor any other conclusion. The evidence 
we had obtained established Ithe defensive, pea:ceful function of this 
concrete fence. 
Also, we heard something at Checkpoint Charley that gave 
us cause for concern. We didn't have time to wait and check the 
story and can't vouch for its validity. But we have no reason 
to doubt its veracity and we pass it on just as we heard it. 
The place was one of the reception rooms in the control sta-
tion operalted by the GDR frontier guards. We were talking with 
guard Heinz Klemm, a 24-year-old woodworker from a small vil-
lage in Thuringia. Heinz's father was a worker, too, he told us, 
and life had not been too easy for the family. When some pals 
of Heinz went to West Berlin and brought back leaflets calling for 
provocations against the GD1R and demanding the incorporaJtion 
of the GDR into the Federal Republic and NATO, Heinz blew 
his top. Next day he quit his job and volunteered fOT Ithe frontier 
guards. 
We asked Heinz if he and his buddies exchanged greetings 
with our American boys at Checkpoint Charley. Heinz replied 
that he had been a frontier guard for two and one-half years and 
had been stationed at various parts of the frontier. He said he 
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ha~ often exchanged civilities with the English and French fron-
tier troops but never with the Americans. 
"The Americans seem really to hate us," he said. "Stay here 
a few days and you'll -see ·them march up to the frontier some 
morning. They raise their hands in the nazi salute and shout 
'Sieg heil!' They know we don't think that's £unny." 
Neither did we. Having visilted Buchenwald and nazi death 
camps' in the USSR, we fail to see anything funny whatsoever in any 
part of nazi ritual 'Or practice. But what disturbed us most was 
Heinz's information about the atJtitude of American youth, who are 
demonstrating hat'red for those very -German youth who are re-
solved there'll be no return of ,the nazis in this part of Germany. 
If Heinz was telling the truth, something seemed very wrong about 
our choice of friends at the wall. 
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III. 
TRUTH ABOUT THE "ESCAPES" 
If the wall is a defense and protection vis-a-vis West Berlin 
and the Federal Republic, is it also a defense and prote~tion vis-a-
vis the East Berliners and the citizens of ,the GDR? Is it, :as 
our newspapers say, a fence to keep GD·R citizens in? The 
barbed wire atop .the concrete bar,rier certainly reminds one of 
pictures of a concentration camp, and ,that is precisely what the 
GDR has been called by its enemies. West ,German Chancellor 
Konrad Adenauer and his aides are forever charging that the peo-
ple of the GDR are virtual prisoners of the 'Communists, held 
against their will and forced to wOTk, and that if the wall wasn ~ t 
there the East Germans would all flee to the Federal Republic. 
We went to see a number of people to get the facts on this 
matter. None of them support Adenauer's claims. 
"Germany has been split into two states since 1949," Hermann 
Axen reminded us. Axe'll is a youthful-appearing, stocky man who 
spent time in Hitler's concentration camps and is no\ov editor in 
chief of Neues DeutschlandJ organ of the ruling Socialist Unity 
Party. 
He talked to us for almost an hour in the office adjoining 
the paper's editorial rooms and had his secretary bring in files 
of old papers from time to time to establish his points. It was 
close to deadline time and we weren't very happy at the thought 
of interviewing ·an editor at such an hour. But Axen seemed 
to think our questions important. 
"The thing to remember is that during all those years from 
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1949 the frontier was open. You could go to West Berlin simply 
by buying a subway ticket and getting off there. And about two 
million people passed back and forth. across the border every day 
in Berlin alone. Sixty thousand East Berliners worked in West 
Berlin and eighteen thousand West Berliners worked in East 
Berlin. So what happened when the border was open? 
"About two ·million people left for good, ClJbout half a million 
came, and about seventeen million stayed. That's important to 
keep in mind-seventeen million of our people stayed." 
"But what about the people who left? Why did they leave?" 
"We estimate that most of the people who left did so for 
economic reasons," Axen replied. "About a third went f.or political 
reasons. 
"Don't forget what the GDR was like during those years after 
the war. This was the least industrialized sec~i()n of Germany. We 
had some factories but no raw materials. All of Germany's heavy 
industry was located. in the ' West, mainly in the Ruhr but also 
in other sections of what is now the Federal Republic. In contrast, 
this was predominantly an agrarian region. 
"Also, don't forget !that this was the homeland of the Junkers 
and the Prussian militarists, and the nazi m'Ovemen t was a mass 
movement here." 
We had heard this from other GDR citizenes. Nazi ideas and 
methods had made a deep im.print. An entire nation had been 
infected. We remembered attending the opera in Leipzig and 
watching the faces in the lobbies during the intermission. A friend 
had answered some of our questions. 
"That one? You can't be sure. I've never seen him before. 
He might be an ex-SS officer-looks arrogant and mean enough. 
But it's wrong to jump to conclusions. He may be completely 
reformed. . . . The elegant one in the ·backless gown? Never SaJW 
her before either. But she's certainly sleek. Definitely well-
preserved-you can bet she wasn't suffering in the early 1940'S .... 
Oh yes, certainly there are Jewish people here. I've never heard 
of any incident. Not that there aren't people Who would like 
to-but they don't dare. They'd land in prison and fast ... " 
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Only seventeen yea·rs since the war ended, since the nazis' house 
of cards crashed, oarrying millions of Germans with it! In East 
Germany they took on the responsihili ty of changing the minds 
and hearts of nearly twenty million people. Two million wouldn't 
stay, and about a third of these wouldn't stay for political reasons! 
How remarkable that those who left for political reasons were 
only one-third of the two million, that is, only a f.ra<:tion of the 
total population of East Germany! This had been the Soviet 
occupation zone, and it had been the Soviet people against whom 
the nazis commi tted their mos t fiendish w,ar crimes. This sector 
"was now ruled by an anti-fascist, anti-racist coalition in which 
German Communists were the most powerful component, and it 
had been the German Communists as ~ll as the "German Jews 
against whom the nazis had been m"ost inhuman. Yet, seventeen 
millions Germans, a majority of whom had been subjected" to the 
virus of nazism, had elected to stay in this pa:rt of Germany! 
"This is the more signi'ficant fact-not the number who left," 
declared Hermann Axen. 
But why are the "escapes" continuing? How many of these can 
be attributed to political disaffection, how many to the economic 
situa1tion? " 
"You asked why we built the wall," he said. "That is one 
of the reasons-to prevent our economy from being undermined. 
First, after the three Western Powers violated the Potsdam Agree-
ment and introduced a sepaTalte currency, they organized the sys-
tematic theft of our goods. Later, when we checked out, they 
launched a massive plunder of our skilled labor force and OUT 
specialists, luring them with all sorts of exaggerated offers and 
promises. To stop this, it was necessary to establ,ish control over 
our frontier. The wall has done that." 
Axen went into detail about both types of "theft." He ex-
plained how the introduction of another currency in West Berlin 
and Western Germany had affected the East German economy. 
West Berlin speculators, he said, had set a,rtificial rates of one 
West mark to four East marks, and this rate had been immedi-
ately recognized by the Western Powers as "official." This enabled 
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people who worked in West Berlin but lived in East Berlin to buy 
goods in East Berlin and sell them in West Berlin at a considerable 
profit. They were paid in vVest marks which they exchanged for 
East Inarks at the rate of one to four, bought up goods in E.as,t 
Berlin, carried them back to West Berlin and sold them for 'Vest 
marks, which they again exchanged for East marks, and so on. 
Thus, the currency "refonn," as it was called in the West, and 
the subsequent manipulation of rates, enabled the enemies of the 
East German regime to corrupt a section of the East Berlin popu-
laltion through financial racketeering, to strip the East German 
stores of consumer goods, and to incite unrest and discontent over 
the resulting shortages. Every year they took out about 5,500 tons 
o.f meat, 2,000 tons of butter, clothes, cameras, typewriters and 
other articles, in vast quantities. 
"The Wes t B'erliners claimed there was no freedom in the 
East," said Axen, "but they came here in droves and bought up 
everything they could. They were perlectly free to do so. 
"This went o.n for years," he Iwent on. "It was ruinous and 
drained the country. It cost us about three-and-a-half billion marks 
a year. Finally, we instituted some oontTol. It no longer was 
so easy for West BeTliners to. come here and buy up our goods. 
But East Berliners who worked in West Berlin and had become 
corrupted could still evade the controls to a certain extent. They 
lived here, enjoyed our low rents, our medical care and other 
social services at the expense of the tax-payers, and at the same 
titne were participating in this robbery of our consumer goods." 
NOIt to be set back by the GD!R's controls, West Berlin and 
West German authorities concentrated on taking the GDR's skilled 
workers. The Federal Republic was enjoying a boom during these 
years, thanks to the Marshall Plan and the enterprise of American 
business bigwigs who are buying into West German corporations. 
Industries were demanding more wo.rkers, and governments and 
politicians took st:eps to get them. GD,R leadeTs speak of what 
followed as "syste·matic head-hunting campaigns." 
A psychologis't friend vvh'O is a staff member of the GDIR's 
outstanding experimental medical institute, told us: "All the 
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experts in our institute have received job offers from "Vest Berlin." 
She said that although she and her colleagues were well paid and 
had the opportunity for advancement, many of the offers from 
West Berlin held out still greater salary increases and promotions. 
The recruitment of the GDR's skilled workers and specialists 
became a fixed policy of all West German corporations and thereby 
the policy of the West German state and the West Berlin govern-
ment. There were other motivations in the development of this 
policy. Bonn politicians saw it as a means of subverting GDR 
authority; West German militarists and revanchists calculated on 
using it to achieve their aims vis~a-vis not only the GDR but also 
the countries of E.astern Europe; the We~tern Powers exploited it 
in the cold war against the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc. 
And to achieve each of these aims, huge sums were spent, special 
purpose organizations were set up by the score, and hundreds 
of thousands of people were employed. 
For example, the Bayer Chemical Works in Leverkusen, FRG, 
is a subsidiary of IG F.arben, the same IG Farben which supplied 
munitions to Hitler's war machines and gas to Himmler's death 
factories. This subsidiary set up a so-called "Immigrants' Com-
mittee" with the set objective of recruiting GDR specialists. To 
anyone who recruited a GD'R scientist it paid a "bonus" of 500 
to 1,000 marks. 
For recruiting pharmaceutical workers from the GDR, the 
Asta Cheluical Works in Brackwede, vVestphalia, paid up to 1,000 
marks. 
In 1960, the Bonn M-inistry for Expelled and "Var Injured 
Persons allocated ~wo million marks (about half a million dollars) 
for the recruitm·ent of GDR university professors. 
In Ig61, the Equalization of Burdens Bank received 37 million 
marks for granting credits to employers who would set up enter-
prises in West Germany with workers recruited from the GDR. 
The Bonn Ministry of Labor and Social Order spent over 
four billion marks (roughly $1 billion!) in Ig61 for "war victims 
and similar expenditures." The term "similar expenditures" was 
a euphernism for recruitment of GDR workers. 
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Such examples could go on and on. The biggest names in 
West German business circles actively participated-Friedrich 
Krupp, Telefunken, AEIG, Deutsche Bank and I,G Farben. All 
the political parties of the Federal Republic took part through 
their "Eastern Bureaus." Every ministry of the Bonn government 
was involved. All the major professional associations and organ-
izations of employers, resettled Germans from Eastern countries, 
veterans and other groupings of the population had special depart-
ments concerned with this work. 
A tell-tale document is a di'rective issued August 21, 1956 by 
the West Germ,an Ministry for All.JGerman Affairs and the Min-
istry for Economic Cooperation "concerning the encouragement 
of meetings on Federal territory or West Berlin between inhabi-
tants of the Soviet occupation zone including East Berlin and 
inhabitants of Federal German territory or 'Vest Berlin.". This 
directive provided for the payment of sums to cover "travelling 
expenses" of GDR citizens enticed to attend such meetings. As 
much as 20,000 marks were paid for these "'travelling expenses." 
The directive stipulated that: "Only citizens of the Soviet occu-
pation zone who can produce evidence of citizenship may receive 
this assistance. Thes'e citizens of the Soviet occupation zone must 
be prepared and able to represent all-German interests in the 
Soviet occupation zone according to the West German conception." 
From the very s tart of this recruitment cam'paign, it was clear 
what was meant by the "West German conception" of "represent-
ing all-German interests" in the GD,R. The recruitment of work-
ers, which many Americans might consider only fair business prac-
tices in a competitive society, ·also entailed other obligations-
espionage, subversion, the fomenting of civil strife. In respect of 
these, all the motivations behind the recruitlnent campaigns co-
incided. GDR leaders have repeatedly listed by address, telephone 
number and name the number of organizations actively working 
in West Berlin to achieve the aim of "liberating" the GDR and its 
socialist allies. The number of these organizations varies. To 
evade detection, names and addresses are frequently changed-it 
may be go today and only 75 next month! 
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The business of recruitment took many forms. In the oase 
of most of those who left the GDIR, the promise of higher wages, 
promotion, comfortable apartments and other amenities not then 
obtainable in the GDR was sufficient. But if these inducements 
proved insufficient, the "head-hunters" used other methods. Elabo-
rate systems for studying the past and present records as well as 
the private lives of GDR citizens were put into operation. A 
nazi past, a long-forgotten police record, marital infidelity, even 
remarks critical of the GDR gO'vernment were used to' "persuade" 
people to' leave for the West. ,Children and young girls were not 
exempted. A yO'uth whO' could be persuaded to com'e over for a 
"night of fun" could also be induced to remain and put pressure 
on his family to leave. 
The propaganda value of every success achieved in thi,s cam-
paign is evident. And it can be said that not only the Bonn and 
West Berlin propagandists but alsO' those in the NAT'O count1rie.s 
including kmericans, made the most of it. Every person who left 
was represented as an "escapee" from "Communism." The whole-
sale recruitment of workers, spies, diversionists and provocateurs 
was called a "Hight to, f.reedom." It was made to seem that the 
CDR was one huge concentration camp of enslaved Germans, 
all of whO'm ,\vere said to be intent on seizing any chance to over-
throw their tormentors and choose the "free world." 
Unfortunately, this picture of the srituation has become a stereo-
type in our O'wn country. Tihis is the picture most Americans 
take with them when visiting Germany. It i~ a great phy-the 
picture is a total distortion of reality. But most An1ericans look-
ing at Berlin and the trwo German states have already been 
brain", ashed. 
"So the wall V\ as put up to stop this traffic. With what results?" 
We put the question to' Hermann Axen and listened to' him 
detail the developments since August 13, 1961. 
"In the main it has been stopped," he said. "We now have a 
strong frontier and one we can cDntrol. The theft of our consumer 
goods has ended, and ,ve have curbed the head-hunters. 
"The wall has paid O'ff economically, too. Of course it CO'St 
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us something to build it and it costs to ma,intain it. But it's been 
an investment from which we have profited and are still profiting. 
All our economic goals were unattainable except in the main items 
so long as the frontier remained open. We had planned a 33 per 
cent increa~e in industrial output by 1961, but except for certain 
major industries we managed to reaoh only 27 per cent. Today 
we are exceeding our goals and doing it without strain." 
Other figures w'e saw showed East Berlin's monthly industrial 
output shot up from 14 million marks worth of goods prior to 
August 13 to 20 l11illion lnarks worth by December 1961. 
Axen said the matter of fulfilling economic plans and reaching 
the planned goals became acute at the time of the fifth congress 
of the Socialist Unity Party. The congress set the objective of 
overtaking and surpassing vVestern Germany in per capita output. 
This would have demonstrated to. the people in both German 
states, had it been" achieved, that socialism was the superior system. 
It was then that Bonn and the West German business community 
accelerated their recruitment campaign, as well as their propa-
ganda effort. They left the GD:R leaders no alternative but that 
of countering their offensive wit]h a measure to cDntrol its frontiers. 
For the bastion and launching-pad of the Bonn offensive was 
West Berlin. This 'was the center of all its activities, the admin-
istrative, organi~ing, directing center for its many thDusands of paid 
labor recruiters, spies and provocateurs. 
"Again and again we appealed to the occupation authorities 
to. stop those activities," Axen continued. "We sent notes. We 
sent documents. We turned over names and addresses. We sup-
plied eye-wiLn~ss accounts of illegal activities, even of criluinal 
activities. We got nowhere. The Western Powers, for their own 
reasons, always sided with Bonn. They even supported and 
assisted these activities. Do you think the Federal Republic and" 
the West Berlin leaders could do this without the protection and 
assistance of the occupation forces? They couldn't carryon for 
a week." 
At this moment Axen's secretaTY brou~ht in files of recent 
issues of N eues Deutschland and the editor in chief pointed out 
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reports of recent "es,capes" of GDR citizens to the West. 
"As you can see, they're still at it," he said. "They feel frus-
trated so they've become more reckless. They spend money and 
hire people to dig tunnels under the wall-anything to bring the 
contacts they've already establlished out of the country and to. acti-
vize new contacts." 
\Ve asked if all the people "escaping" or trying to lea\-e could be 
characterized as agents of the West. 
"No, not everyone. The wall actually produced hardship for 
some people. Their relatives are in the West and they are here. 
They have dear friends in the West. We took this into account 
at the beginning and we s till do. 
"When we put up the wall we arranged fO'r visits of West 
Berliners to East Berlin. We announced that West Berliners were 
free to come over, but we insisted on <?ur right to select those who 
came. We had no intention of letting a swarm of. saboteurs and 
spies enter our country under the pretext of having relat·ives or 
friends here. 
"We set up booths on the territory of the Berlin transit system 
to facilitate this traffic. The o.fficials in these bo.oths were author-
ized to accept applications for entry-permits and to process them 
quickly and efficiently. But no sooner had we opened these booths 
than the West Berlin authorities launched a two-pronged attack 
against them. When hundreds of West Berliners lined up to 
apply for permits, crowds of hoodlums were organized and sent 
to the booths. They threatened and assaulted the West Berliners 
and in some cases tried to. set fire to the booths. 
"At the same time, the West Berlin police appeared with war-
rants from t:he West Berlin Senate demanding that the booths be 
closed. I must tell you frankly that the warrants indicated that 
they had originally been issued by the Western occupation powers. 
"Soon the booths had to be closed. But that doesn't end the 
matter. We are still willing to allow West Berliners to visit East 
Berlin if they apply for a permit with sufficient reason." 
We reminded Axen that he had said the necessity to. secure its 
economy, had been only one of the reasons for the GDR govern-
ment's decision to build the w.all. We asked him what other 
rea.sons lay behind the decision. His remarks in answer to this 
question concluded our int.erview. They are, we believe of para-
mount concern for Americans. But before recounting them it is 
worth while to relate additional information we obtained con-
cerning the "escapes to freedom." 
Two of the people we saw had quite a lot to say on the subject 
of the current "escapes." One was Josef Streit, GDR State Prose-
cutor, a post w.ith functions similar to those of our U.S. Attorney 
General. The other was Waldemar Schmidt, deputy Mayor of 
Berlin, the GDR's capital. Besides being extremely informative, 
talking with these men w·as a rewarding personal experience. Like 
other leading personalities of the GDR government, and in con-
trast to their counterparts in the Federal Republic, they were 
Hfe-Iong anti-fascists. None are Johnny-come-lateHes to the anti-
fascist struggle, or ex-nazis anxious to cover up their past. Schmidt 
is a former Berlin machinist who became a working class leader 
in his youth. The Gestapo arrested him in 1935. He stayed in 
Hitler's prisons until he "was freed by Soviet troops in 1945. A~ 
for Streit, his background wa~ dramatized for us by an event in 
West Germ.any which occurred shortly before our interview. 
Streit was born and reared in Czechoslovakia's Sudeten area. 
He grew up in the same town and at the same time as another 
German named Wolfgang Fraenkel. Coincidence would have it 
that while Streit became GDR Procurator ·General, Fraenkel be-
came the Feder~l R .. epublic's Procurator General. But at the time 
we talked with Streit, his townsman had been removed from the 
FRG post aluidst much crit,icism and controversy. Behind 
Fraenkel's dismissal was an enormous file of documents establish-
ing the FR·G procurator's participation in some of the worst 
crimes commlitted by the nazis. T 'he documents had been delivered 
to W es t German officials by Streit. 
Streit's path was different. He, too, might have followed 
in the footsteps of Fraenkel and become a judge passing out 
sentences on people the nazi~ wanted to exterminate. But when 
Strert's father, a glass-maker, died after the first world war, the boy 
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learned printing and entered the working people's movement of 
Czechoslovakia. In 1938 Streit was imprisoned by the Nazis. He 
passed through Dachau and Malthausen concentration camps 
be£ore he was freed in 1945 by United States troops. When such 
a man speaks, you can't help thinking of the price he paid to 
defend his conception of the truth. 
"Yes, we have good reason to know about these escapes," he 
said. "We've just finished a trial in the supreme court." 
He opened a drawer and selected a large folder of legal 
papers which he thumbed through and selected one to read. 
"The principal defendants were Gottfried Steglich and Carston 
~·fchr," Strait 3Jid. "They are members of the Girrman Group 
in West Berlin, an organization which specializes in organizing 
border incidents and "escapes." 
"The Girrman organizatjon rnaintains a secret students' group 
at the Ford University in West Berlin. According to Steglich, 
this university group has three hundred members and functions 
along strictly conspiratorial lines. 
"You should know tha-t Steglich flunked out of high school 
in the GDR in 1953. He went to West Berlin and received a 
scholarship at Ford's universi.ty. He was a good pupil in other 
things if not in his studies, and before we oaught him he had 
been ass,istant chief of a refugee reception center at 20 Sued-
westkorso, in West Berlin. Like all the members of the Girrman 
group who do full-time work for tha1t group, he was also on the 
payroll of the West Berlin Senate. 
"We know, and witness Juergen Miehlke substantiated our 
knowledge during the trial, that the Ginman organization has a 
special so-called 'tunnel detachment' who got a plan of the city's 
underground sewers, cables and passageways from no less authori-
tative a source than the office of West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt. 
"D,efendants testified at the trial that members of the Girrman 
organization systematically visit the GDR at fixed intervals. They 
come to ferret OUit terminal points for tunnels and to arr1ange for 
escapes. Every person recruited for an escape brings the Girrman 
agent a four hundred mark bonus. 
"We found five weapons on the defendants-Browning auto-
matics used in the Belgian army. One also had an American-
made walkie ... talkie to talk from the east side of the wall to his 
fI1iends in '''Test Berlin. Both were convicted, and at the end 
of the trial Steglich appealed to his colleagues in West Berlin 
to stop working for the Girrman oT~anization." 
"And what was the outcome of the trial?" we asked. 
"Steglich got fifteen years. Mohr received seven." 
"How do these people come over from West Berlin?" 
"Through the control posts. You see, any West Berlin cItIzen 
can come over if he has a permit. A student might say, for 
example, that he wants to obtain material from our l(ibraries. 
Unless he has a record or our people can identify him as a member 
of -some hostile organizaJtion, he is given a permit. For those 
that don't care to subject themselves to OUT examination, there is 
another way. 
"Steglich testified that he had forged t1wo hundred and thirty 
passports and " had used the passeports of ci tizens of Switzerland, 
Denmark, Belgium and Sweden. Stegl,ich testified that he person-
ally had supplied melnbers of his organization with these pass-
ports and had issued each one a packet containing some of "the 
currency, cigarettes, matches and clothes labels of the country 
which issued the passport. They preferred Swiss and Austrian 
passports because that would eliminate the problem of language." 
Sometime later in our own "country we had cause to recall 
Streit's conversa.tion. We read a United Press Internat'ional report 
from Berlin dated September 19, 1962. It related the "escape to 
freedom" of 29 persons through such a tunnel ,.vhose constructIon 
-in the words of the press report-had been "undertaken with 
the full knowledge of the West Berlin city government." The 
report went on to declare that "Mayor Willy Brand't press office 
said that work on the tunnel was carried out by university students, 
reported to be graduate students of West Berlin's Technical 
University." 
In the office of the deputy mayor of East Berlin we gained 
another linsigh t in to the "escapes to freedom." I t was an aspect 
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we Americans seldom if ever read or hear about-the flight to the 
E'ast. The editor of N eues Deutschland had estimated that during 
the period from 1949 to 1961 approximately half a million people 
had come to the GDR from the West. Waldemar Schmidt brought 
the figures up to date. 
"Every day West Berliners and West Germans send us applica-
tions for citizenship in our country," he said. "They want to 
remain and to lh,e and work here, and among them are many 
former 'political refugees.' Of course, we screen these applications 
very thoroughly. \Ve keep most of the applicants. Some we send 
back." , 
"How many stay?" 
"About .ten or twelve every day." 
This is something most Americans know nothing about. The 
"~sca'Pes" we've heard or read of have always been "to the free 
world," that is, to West Berlin and West Germany. According 
to the picture of life in the tWlO German states which most Amer-
icans have had stuffed into their minds, why would any sensible 
German want to go to the GDR? We put the question to Mayor 
Schmidt. 
"rJ.1hey come for 'many reasons," was his answer. "For jobs 
which they know they can ge,t here. For OUT pensions and social 
security which they oan't get in West Germany. Then, some of 
,these people lived here before and want to return to spend the 
rest of thejr lives in their birthplace. Some have parents and 
other relatives, some have old friends they want to be near. Most 
cf the youth who come do so to escape the militarization of West 
Germany. They don't want to serve in an anny like the army 
their Eathers and uncles served in-and maybe died in." 
"Do any come for political reasons?" 
"Yes, some do. Some see what is happening in West Germany 
and fear the 1930'S are coming back again." 
Mayor Schmidt anticipated an increase in the flow ~f Germans 
from the West. We gathered that he believed the West German 
~oom had levelled off and the economic situation in the Federal 
Republic would continue to deterior.ate. The demand for work-
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ers had ended and unemployment was beginning to rise. Big 
struggles for increased wages and social security were under way 
in the trade unions. We know today that Schmidt was right. 
That doesn't mean, hmvever, that efforts to recruit citizens of 
the GDR will be abandoned. The economic motivation may dis-
appear, but this can spur even more intense efforts to penetrate the 
wall. Economic difficulties, by increasing the discontent of the 
resettled Gennans, may give added force to revanchist propaganda, 
to demand for "restoring our lanrls and properties in the East." 
Our interview with Mayor Schmidt helped clarify a number 
of facts about the Berlin wall, whi<:h in turn led us to the con-
clusion that: 
1. The wall represents not an act of aggression against the 
West but an act of defense against attacks from the West. 
2. The wall represses only, the small minority of citizens of the 
GDR whose activities jeopardize the security and interests of the 
majority of GDR citizens; it serves to protect the interests and 
security of the majority of the GDR population. 
3. By no stretch of the imagination does the wall in any way 
whatsoever constitute an infringement on or a threat to the rights 
and interests of the Amerioan people. 
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lV. 
THE "TAME" TIGER IN OUR FLArr 
Having established these facts to our own satisfaction, we 
decided to follow up another popular notion which we fel t re-
quired investigation. This is the widespread belief that there is 
no individual liberty in the GDR, no comfort, no material well-
being, no freedom from care, no gaiety. According tQ this view, 
widely held by misinformed Americans, everything is drab and 
dull in the GDR, life is a continuous struggle and drudgery, people 
are shoddily dressed, often go hungry, and no one dares say ,,,,hat 
he really thinks for fear of the secret police. 
This belief feeds and supports the "escape to freedom" propa-
ganda; it is little wonder, then, that the Bonn and West Berlin 
propagandists have nurtured it so assiduously. Americans who 
repeat it uncritically and spread it as gospel truth are not doing 
their fellow-countrymen a service. This "truth" bears no relation 
whatsoever to reality. 
We attended a forum of wQrking and student youth in the 
university town of Jena. Present were officials of the GDR gov-
ernmen t, the ci ty administration, the Soci1alis t U ni ty Party, and 
the Free German Youth. The hall was packed to the rafters, 
wlhich is the only place where we found seats. We had been 
informed that these forums are held at regular intervals all over 
the GDR. Their aim is to enlist the interest and participation 
of young Germans in efForts to solve the problems of local com-
munities, ci·ties, and the 'GD·R as a whole. The youth are enGOur-
aged to raise any question that concerns them. No holds are 
barred. 
It was an extraordinary experience for us. We had just been 
to Buchenwald and made notes of, among other things, the two 
signs on the gates, hanging just as the nazis had placed them for 
the edification of their v.ictims: "To each his just desserts," and 
"My oountry, right or wrong." Buchenwald and what it repre-
sented had made of ,the Germans-those that survived-a nation 
Df silent people. Now here, a few miles from Buchenwald were 
gathered the children of those silent Germans. HDW would they 
behave? 
They behaved as you would expect a similar gathering of 
American youth to behave~with one point of difference. They 
spoke without restraint or self-consciousness. They vied for the 
chance to speak. They heckled one another as well as the speakers · 
on the platfDrm. If they didn't like a speech or a statement, they 
booed. If they liked it, they whistled and stamped their feet. The 
one point in which they differed from most American student 
audiences was this: they were amazingly well-infDrmed Dn inter-
national and national affairs. 
Here are some of the questiDns they asked: 
"Why did we have to postpone the realization Df our eCDnDmic 
plan for overtaking West Germany f~om Ig61 to' Ig65?" 
"Why did we make such a difficult plan in the first place?" 
"Why did our newspapers puhlicize the g-oals so much?" 
"W!hy did we cut out our airplane industry, and who was re-
sponsible for this mistake?" 
There were, of CDurse, other questions to be expeoted from 
an assemblage . of youth: "Why is J ena so dull for youth? Why 
does our radio plague us on Saturdays and Sundays with broad-
casts about collective farms?" 
Filled with phony preconceptions of German youth, we were 
astounded at their conduct and paliticipatiDn in the forum. We 
had expected flo hear questiDns like the last one, but we had not 
dnticipated that the German youth of today would be so deeply 
concerned wi th every aspect of their country's economy, and would 
boldly challenge their government leaders to explain and account 
for mistakes. 
Such a forum could not take place in the Federal Republic. 
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Though some West German youth have managed to sustain a genu-
ine interest in the economic and political development of the FRG, 
they have not been encouraged to express their views, certainly 
not if their views are critical of the Establishment. In the Federal 
Republic, silence is Sltill golden. . 
As for the "drabness" of GDR life, one wonders how this idea 
gained currency. True, night clubs as we know them, dance 
halls and honky-tonks are in short supply in the GDR. Prostitution 
has been eliminated. Some of the boys might garther in a back 
room for a quiet game from time to time, but gambling is also 
in its death throes. There is plenty of drinking, but mostly in 
homes. Add up all of these items and for some people the total 
may amount to a dull life. But this was not our impression of 
people's lives in the GDR. 
The per capita participation in sports, for instance, far exceeds 
our own. We visited the GDR University for physical culture and 
sports in Leipzig and learned that a large propoI'ltion of its 2,000 
students were adult workers studying through correspondence 
courses. One of the most comfortable, most scenic train rides in 
the world is the jou~ney down the Elbe from Berlin, and all this 
country is virtually a sportsman's paradise. Individuals, families, 
groups-here in the Elbe Valley during the summer they are swim-
ming, boating, hiking, camping, playing all kinds of games, and-
believe it or not-apparently Liking it! . 
There is good music on the Berlin radio. Admittedly, we 
shared the desire of many German youth for more of the popular 
tunes. But no one can complain they don't hear the clasSlics. 
Nor is there ground for compla'int about East Berlin's theater fare. 
The nights we attended the Berlin Brecht Ensemble and the Berlin 
Opera in March, 1961, the East Berliners were far outnumbered 
by the West Berliners! We remember asking ourselves at that 
time, cell life its so much gayer and pleasanter in West Berlin 
than it is here, why in heck don't some of these West Berliners 
go home and let us get to the coffee counter?" 
It's even said in the West in all seriousness, that love has been 
outlawed in the GDR and that one never sees young couples dis-
play affection for -one another. This kind of idiocy is} of course, 
easily put to rest by a single statistic: in East Berlin there are 15 
births per 1,000 people; in West Berlin only ten. 
As for the material well-being of people in the GD'R, we found 
no one badly off, no one without shelter, clothes, shoes, personal 
necessit-ies, or enough to eat. Stories of mass hunger, of homeless 
people, of children withoUit shoes or clothes are simply falsehoods. 
What we saw of housing conditions in the GDR compares favor-
ably with what we saw in any of the working class districts 'of 
West Berlin, London and Paris. It certainly stands up well in 
comparison with the working class districts of New York, Chicago 
and Los Angeles. 
There is a housing shovtage in the GDR, and ' in the cities 
which suffered great bomb and artillery damage there is still 
overcrowding. Mayor Schm'idt told us that about 30,000 East 
Berliners still needed fiats. He estimated that a few years more 
would be required to saltisfy this need. In the last few years the 
East Berlin administration has built approximately 10,000 flats 
per year, but the construction of a chemical industry and electrical 
equipment plants, as well as a civic center at Marx-Engels Platz, 
have now been given priority. 
During both our visits to Germany we sruw an abundance of 
food in GDR stores. Meat, vegeta:bles, fowl and fruit were avail-
able everywhere. However, we were told by friends that shortages 
of one or another food do occur. And we read in GDR publica-
tions of l,ast August that meaJt was in shor.t supply and that a 
system of customer registration had to be established so as to 
prevent inequity in distribution. There had also been a shof1tage 
of potatoes which are a staple of the Gennan diet. 
These shol1tages give rise to complaints and grumbling, as 
might be expected. Customer regi~tration, as we have reason to 
know from our wartime experiences, is disagreeable. But short-
ages in . some foods is not hunger, customer registrat~on is not 
sltarvation, and grumbl;ing is not revollt. To say that they mean 
the sa:me thing may be good cold war propaganda, bu t no one 
should mistake it for the truth. 
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What the shortages and customer registnlltion indicate is that 
the GDR has not yet ensured the uninterrupted supply of all kinds 
of food for its population. We inquired about this and talked 
wIDth a number of people responsible for planning Ithe country's 
economic growth. We were told that the harvest was lean last 
winter because of the weather. The shortage of fodder forced the 
slaughter of livestock, resulting in a shortage of mealt. An agri-
cuI1turai specialist gave a more fundamental explanation. Re 
thought the GDR had been unahle to make the massive invest-
ment required for a more rapid development of its chemi1cal indus-
try and the mechanization of farm work. This, he believed, was 
one of the consequences of the West German economic offensive 
against the ,GD:R. 
Wha/tever the cause, the government appeared to be concerned 
with solving the problem once and [or all. During .our visrit we 
were given to underSltand that leaders of the government and 
the political parties were engaged in meetings with farnlers and 
agonomists. Nelles Deutchland and other GDR ne,vspapers were 
carrying al'lticles about various aspects of the problem. Already a 
change had begun. The first half of 1962 regiSitered a 12.5 per cent 
increase in industrial and agricultural output over the same period 
of the preceding year.. And G,DR citizens insist that despite 
shortages and the lag in fertilizer manufaoture and mechanization 
Ithey consume more protein £ood per capita than the people of 
West Germany. They claim they achieved this superiority several 
years ago, 'W1hile the frontiers were open, and they have figures 
to prove it: 57.1 kilograms of mealt consumed per oapita in the 
GD,R in 1960 as against 54.5 kilograms in the Federal Republic; 
13.6 kilograms of butter as against 7.8 kilograms in the FRG; 30 .3 
kilograms of sugar as against 27.3 kilograms in West Germany. 
These realities of life in the GDR cleared up many questions 
that had been b.othering us. They made it clear that West German 
propaganda about conditJrons in the GDR is fabricated out of 
thin air. In respect to all the necessities that make for material 
well-being, Germans in the GD,R were not in any degree worse 
off than the Germans living in the FoRG. To be sure, they wanted 
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more alnenilties, more luxuries. They were critical of mistakes 
and shortcomings of their leade.vs. But that didn't mean they were 
timpatient to bring back their former employers and landlords 
and restore them in government. They had emphasized this 
die tinction on more than one occasion. 
They had done it in June, 1953. The West Berliners and 
the Bonn politicians may still talk about a "popular uprising." 
They may name the street leading into West Berlin from the 
Brandenburg Gate after that event-"June 17 Street"-and boast 
that only the intervention of SOVliet troops had defeated the 
"revolt." In the GD,R everyone kno.ws the people themselves 
crushed that fascist putsch, that the Soviet troops intervened only 
in Berlin, and that even there the workers had begun to arm for a 
showdo.wn with the provocateurs from West Berlin. 
They did it again when the wall was built. Workers who had 
previo.usly been co.nsidered "non-political" by their colleagues 
vol un teered to guard the facto.ries and cri tical poin ts of the fron-
tier. Two hundred thousand youth had to be turned away from 
People's .A.rmy enlistlnent stations because· of insufficient housing 
to acco.mmodate them. Applications for membership in the So-
cialis t U ni,ty Party sharply increased. 
When West German leaders ignore these facts, and other evi-
dence of the GD,R population'S determinatJion to build socialism 
in their country, is it merely because they are blind to the realities 
or is ift also because they fear these realities? When they keep 
insisting "'we must rescue our hrothers," is it no more than a case 
of "none so blind as t'hey who. will not see?" True, in the past 
the West German leaders have demDnstrated that they possess 
more than their full measure of these afflictions. But it is signifi-
cant that they use drastic and brutal measures to prevent the 
West German population from learning these realities and acting 
on them. 
The concensus of opinion in the GDR is Ithat the West German 
leaders are fully aware of the realities of life in the GDR, but 
are bent Dn colliding with these realities-·with their eyes wide 
open-even though they kno.w that to do. so means to encounter 
resistance. They are like a driver who, seeing the traffic snarl 
at an intersection, deliberately ignores the traffic signal and speeds 
past the red light, though it means an inevitable collision. The 
weight of evidence strongly suggests that a collision was the driver's 
intent. And that is exactly how the people of the GDR regard 
the provocations and the propaganda of the West German leaders-
an armed clash is their aim. 
If one were to pursue the analogy of the driver a little fur,ther 
and argue that if sober he was insane or bent on suicide, the 
analogy would {;l1I flat at this point. No GDR. leader believes 
Bonn Chancellor Adenauer and War MiniSlter Strauss or Alfred 
Krupp and Herm1ann J. Abs of the Deutsche Bank are insane or 
tired of living. No one believes they are unaware of the fact that 
an armed clash 31t ~he Berlin wan will bring NATO troops 
into collision with troops of the Warsaw Alliance. Or, more specifi-
cally, American forces illlto collision wi~h Soviet forces. Nor is 
there doubt that in Bonn and Cologne and Essen and Hamburg 
the leading circles understand full well what that kind of a col-
lision-in these days of hydrogen-tipped nuclear missiles and the 
present relationship of forces being what it is-will mean for them. 
No, it would be misreading the signs to think that the WeSlt Berlin 
politicians, militarists and induSitrialists are ins'ane or bent on 
suicide. Behind ~heir rashness is a calculated risk, of course, but 
there is also' something else-another aim. 
This was lhe hypothesis to which the logic of everything we saw 
and heard in the two German states led us. We didn'lt reach it 
quickly or easily. We reached it only after assimilating a vast 
accumulation of statistics, interviews, impressions, newspaper clip-
pings, magazine articles, books, official documents, and notes, notes 
notes about everything we saw, heard and experienced. It was a 
maze of information, some of which led off into blind alleys or 
meaningless detours. OU,r chit-chat with Germans alone would 
add up to a sizable volume. What illuminated the entire mass 
of data, however, was the almost casual account Hermann Axen 
gave us of why the wall had been built in the first place. It ,vas 
close to Neues Deutschland's deadline and Axen had already ex-
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plained the economic significance of the wall. Then, wi thou t 
any change of tone, "Furthermore," he declared, "you Americans 
should bless us for building the wall. None Df us would be here, 
very probably, if we had nDt built it." 
It w·ag said casually, and it wasn't very different from the kind 
of remarks one hears frequently in these times. Had it come fro.m 
almos1t anyone of our acquaintances we might have shrugged it 
off. But we didn't, because Axen didn't impress us as a main 
inclined to $-peak lightly about such a matter, or even to be casual 
about it. On the contrary, he was very serious. 
"'Possibly YDU will rememher that in the spring and summer 
of 1961 Prime Minister Khrushchev had much to. say about a 
peaceful settlement of the German question. He made several 
speeches in his own country on the questiDn, and in Vienna on 
June 4 he presented your President Kennedy with a memor-andum 
which contained the Soviet prDposals as to how a settlement could 
be reached peacefully." 
The substance of that memorandum was the well-known Soviet 
proposal to conclude a German peace treaty. In order to nego-
tiate this, Khrushchev also proposed immediate convocation of a 
peace conference, establishment 'Of West Berlin as a free city, and 
a suggestion that the talks on such a treaty be held ,to a period 
of six months. The memorandum also stipula1ted a num:ber of 
concessions which the Soviet Union was prepared to m'ake so as 
not to "prejudice the interests of the United States or other powers 
in Europe," as the wording of the document puts it. The memo 
assured President Kennedy that 'the Soviet Union would not de-
mand the immediate wilth<kawal of the Federal Republic from 
NIATO; would not seek the recognition of the German Democratic 
Republic or cite Federal Republic of Germany by all parties to. the 
treaty; would not object to two ·treaties if the United States is not 
reaci.y to sign a single peace treaty ,vith hoth German states; \vould 
not object-in order to guarantee the free status of West Berlin-
t o the s,tationing of "token contingents of troops" of the four 
occupying powers, or of "troops Df neutral countries under Uni:ted 
Nations auspices for the same purpose." 
43 
The memo also stipulated Soviet willingness to accept an 
"interim solution" of the Berlin question "if for one reason or 
another the Governments of the United States and other Western 
powers are not ready f'Or this." It assured President Kennedy 
that "the Soviet Government is ready to exa'mine any constructive 
proposals by the United StJates Government on a German peace 
treaty and normalization of the situation in West Berlin. The 
Soviet Government will show the maximum of good will in order 
to solve the problem of a German peace t'reaty by mutual agree-
ment between the USSR, the United States and the other states 
concerned." Finally; Khrushchev's memorandunl said that "if the 
United States does not show an understanding of the necessity 
for concluding a peace treaty, 'we \'V'ould regret this since we would 
have to sign a peace treaty, which it would be impossible and 
dangerous to delay further, not with all states but only with those 
that wIant to sign it." 
This memorandum, wlhich 1TIOSIt Americans seem not to have 
read, struck several new notes. The proposal that the powers 
negotiate a settlement of the German question was not one of 
them, having been made in 1949, 1952, 1954 and 1959. One thing 
that was new was the eXltent to which the Soviet Union was ready 
to accommodate its interests so as not to prejudice American 
interests. Another thing that was new ,vas the memorandum's 
tone of urgency in face of the growing militarization and declared 
revanchist aims of the West Germ,an state. The memo said: "The 
question of a peace treaty is the question of the national security 
of the USSR and many other staJtes." 
Hermann Axen continued his account. "You know what hap-
pened. Your government repLied on July 17 and said there was 
no need for a peaceful settlement because West Germany was 
not threatening anyone. Keep the date in mindl l it'S important 
because nine days before, on July 8 to be precise, Adenauer's 
Christian Democrats had held a secret session at Bonn and issued 
a communique. In this communique they dropped for the first 
time their usual demagogy about the reunification of Germany. 
They said the question of German reunification would be solved 
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by integrating all of Germany into NATO." 
He asked us if we thought our government knew about this 
decision of Adenauer' sparty at the time of drafting the reply to 
the Soviet Union. We replied that we didn't know since it was the 
first time we had heard about the Bonn communique. Axe'll 
continued. 
"Another date. May 1961. The NATO Military Planning 
Committee met in Washington and produced a plan to finish 
rearming West Germany this year. If you look over the plan-
they call it MC g6-·-YOll'll see it has in mind ' Vest Germany's 
nuclear armament." 
Adolph Heusinger, one of Hilder's top generals, a war criminal 
wanted for atrocities against Soviet people and for exterminating 
Jews, is chairman of NAT'O's Military Planning Committee and 
has an office in the Pentagon in Washington. Certainly the State. 
Depalitment knew of this NATO plan before drafting the reply 
to Moscow's memo. 
IThere was another date about which Axen could not be certain. 
It was during the visit of Adenauer and Strauss to Washington 
in the SpTing of 1961. He didn't ·know the precise date of their 
ta]l~ with President Kennedy. It ·was April 12 or 13. 
"They asked Kennedy for help in supporting an uprising in 
the GDR. Kennedy was ·skept1ical of their conviction it could be 
pulled off successfully. He told them to go ahead if they thought 
they could do it, but not to bank on U ni:ted States support. ,tV e 
unders.tand that he felt if it worked, fine; if it didn't wQrk h would 
discredit us and our claim to have a peace treaty. So, fQur dattes, 
and they all add up to something." 
The implication was clear. Even if the President had not been 
apprised of the ChTistian Democvatic Party's communique of 
July 8, even had he discounted elements of danger in the NAT·O 
plan of May, he could hardly have been impervious to the inten-
tions of the West German leaders. His conversation with theIn, 
ifAxen's information was ·correct, had occurred even before his 
meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna. This was the logic Q1f i,t, 
but logic alone doesn't always provide the correct conclusion. We 
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wondered aloud if that had spurred the GDR to put up the wall. 
Axen shook his head. 
"T·hat was only part of it. Knowing Bonn's intentions, know-
ing the Bundswehr's capabilities, knowing Kennedy's attitude to 
an attack on us, to another attempted putsch-this was only part 
of it. The other part is that preparations for war actually took 
an active turn. NA. TO openly threatened war. There was a full 
alarm throughout NATO. In Ig60, there were only two NAJTO 
maneuvers; in Ig61, NATO held five. This was done when 
Heusinger called for taotical atomic weapons to be st·ationed 
near our frontJieT. 
"At the same time we observed signs of activization of certain 
circles inside the GDR. "\Ve suddenly had a renewal of trouble 
with the Church. O!ld nazis and dissidents beoame very act,ive. 
It was only when all these things began Ito coincide that we notified 
the Warsaw Powers we considered it necessary to fortify our fron-
cler. Of course, they agreed." 
Again the logic held. Certainly no government with a sense 
of responsihility to its people could remain indifferent in the 
face of such circumstances. One coincidence could be ignored, 
two overlooked, three discounted after an eVlaluation, but when 
the coincidences became still more numerous there was real cause 
for concern. Yet, it seemed to us not unlikely that when Adenauer 
and Strauss learned they could not count on the United States 
to pull their chestnuts out of the fire they discarded the scheme. 
In that case the GDR may have built the wall unnecessarily, at 
least from the standpoint of its mHitary defensive funotion. Axen 
didn't think so. 
"It must surely have interested Americans to observe what 
ha ppened after the wall was built. The Wes t Germans and the 
West Berliners ranted and raved but they didn':t attack the wall. 
In fact, not a single revanchist dared show up at ,the wall. But 
Willy Brandt called on Kennedy to attack the wall. He wrote a 
letter asking Kennedy to 'take the final risk.' And when Kennedy 
refused and sent your Vice PresideIllt Lyndon B. Johnson to make 
big speeches against the wall without doing anything about it, 
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Bonn and West Berlin were fuvious. They began to a,ttack Ken-
nedy for 'selling them down the river.' For a time Kennedy and 
his 'eggheads' were held responsible. It was a case of history 
repeaJting itself. After the first big war they held the pacifists 
and socialists responsible for defeat. After the second war they 
even got around ro blaming Hitler. Now it's your turn." 
By the time we left Berlin, ,ve felt we had seen and heard 
enough to warrant still another conclusion about the wall. After 
weighing the evidence we are prepared to stand by it: Not only 
the 17 million Germans in the GDR were rescued from disaster 
by the wall. The 50 million Germans in the FRG, the over-
whelming majority of whom are ordinary people like ourselves, 
busy at trying to make a living and raise families and find some 
happiness and meaning in their lives, were also rescued from an 
uncertain fate. 
But what came home to us most directly was the conviction 
that the wall was a godsend for the A me.rican people. 
The decision to build the wall was a joint decision of th·e 
Warsaw Pact powers. Prior to that decision there was concern-
we would even say, deep anxiety-in all the socialist countries. We 
know the feeling that swept the Soviet Union during the weeks 
that preceded that decision. We read of manifestations of that 
feeling in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, 
China-yes, even in the Mongolian People's Republic. l.lhere was 
general alar,m that N'ATO's preparations, President Kennedy's call-
up of reserves and request for more funds for the military, and 
the increasingly belligerent and arrogant tone of the vVest. Ger-
man leaders indicated preparations for ,var. The Soviet Govei'n-
mellit expressed its own alarm by cancelling the scheduled demo-
bHization of the 1,200,000 troops it had unilaterally decided to 
return to civilian st'atus at the beginning of 1960. It also resumed 
nuclear weapons tests. Like the GDR government, none of the 
Warsaw Pact governments accepted Plfesiden:t Kennedy'S assurances 
that the West Germans were not able to wage war, were under the 
"'control" of NAT'O which ,vas represented as being solely defen-
sive, and had given their word not to use force. 
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At that time it was common knowledge throughout the socialist 
countries (and it certainly should have been told the American 
people) that the Weslt German army numbered 300,000 actives 
and 250 ,000 reservists; that the land forces had 2,400 tanks and 
1,500 armored carriers; that the air forces included five fighter-
bomber squadrons adapted for carrying atom bombs, a missile 
group and four N ike ground-to-air battalions; that the naval forces 
included 17 combat squadrons including DWO of destroyers, four 
of torpedo boats, seven of mine s,weepers, one of landing craft-
a total of 240 vessels of whi<;:h 136 were combat ships. The equip-
ment of these forces with missiles and other weapons of mass 
annihilation had been going on since 1958. Ilts eight artillery 
battalions attached to the divisions were armed with 203.3 mm. 
atomic cannon. l It had three Honest John missile batalions attached 
to the army corps. Since the spring of 1961, of course, all these 
figures have been greatly augmented. BUtt already at that time 
West Germany's armed forces had come to dominate NATO, and 
as every American knows by this time, the top members of the 
German General Staff, all former Hitler officers, held the leading 
strategic roles in NA T IO. 
The notion that West German membership in NATO would 
somewhow exercise restraint on the Bonn politicians, Ruhr indus-
trialists and old-line General Staff commanders, all of whom "were 
either nazis and nazi supporters, is considered ridiculous-utter 
unadul,terated nonsense-lin tJhe socialist countries and even amongst 
the majority of West Europeans, who know these West Ger1man 
leaders from personal experience. We have heard the idea com-
pared to the case of the animal trainer who tried to persuade his 
neighbors in a crowded apartment house to let him keep a full-
grown Bengal tiger in his fiat. As the story goes, he gave his word 
that the beast was tame, had been raised on milk, liked to be 
cuddled, and, in any case, wouldn't leave 'his maste.r's fiat. Of 
course the neighbors, people with rudimentary common sense, were 
not persuaded. And the story ends with the line: "They are still 
alive, but the poor tiger died." 
N or ~re the people of Europe, West as well as East, disposed 
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to stake their lives on the word of honor of these eX-iJlazis. They 
remember too well how many times a West German leader's word 
was broken at the very moment he was giving it. T 'hey don't 
have to go to the history books for this infor'mation-it's part of 
their personal experience. Some Americans also know this. For 
ins1tance, Fred Warner Neal, a former newspaper man and State 
Department officer who is now a professor at the Claremont Gradu-
ate School, gave a lecture on July 20, 1961 in which he said: 
, I V\ ell recall being in Frankfurt and Bonn in 19.50, on a 
mission for the U.S. State Department, V\Then there were news-
paper reports thaJt the W es t German governmen t had a 'defense 
adviser.' This was indignantly denied by both the Americans 
and the Germans, although everybody knew it w'as true. Then 
it was admiltted, but the West Germ'ans said, solemnly, they had 
no defense ministry. A few months later the defense adviser 
became minister of defense, but, the West Germans said, no 
army. A few months, later there began to be organized a 
German army, but, said the West Germans, no tradiltional uni-
forms and no generals. A few lllonths later the army donned 
t!he tradit.ional uniforms and the rank of general was re-estab-
lished, but, it was said, no general staff, and so on. About the 
same time West Germany adopted as its national anthem the 
infamous 'Deutschland uber Alles/ but, it was said, the first 
verse containing the offensive 'w'ords, would not be used. Now 
the anthem begins, as before, 'Deutschland, Deutschland, ilber 
Alles.' 
"Goethe, in an untypical poetic burst of patriotism, once 
wrote that ,vhen he thought of Germany he could not sleep. 
I t is not surprising that today a great many other people cannot 
sleep when they think of Gei'many-but for other reasons."'*' 
Such keen observations of one of the most conspicuous European 
,. War and Peace and the Problem of Berlin, by Fred Warner Neal, Marzani 
& l\1unsell, Inc., New York, N. Y. 
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realities come from few Amemcans, but one hears them in ordinary 
conversations everywhere in Europe. The socialist governments, 
keenly sensitive to every straw-in-the-'wind relating to changes in the 
plans of Bonn, were alerted early enough during the spring of 
1961 to take counter action. rrhese actions were understood quite 
thoroughly by the public of the socialist states, and those journalists 
erred who reported, for instance, that the Sov:iet people were not 
informed of the resumption of nuclear tests by their government. 
How cl1ey could mdss being informed, when every newspaper in 
the Soviet Union devoted it~ entire front page to announcing the 
governmen t' s decision, was never explained. The fact is that 
the preparations of the Warsaw Pact countries to counter NATO 
preparat.iQns were common knowledge throughout EurDpe, having 
been publicized by the press of the s.ocialist countries. 
Bonn also drew conclusions from the direction developments 
were takting. When Adenauer and Strauss a~certained that the 
Kennedy AdministraJtion was unwilling to commit the United 
States to armed support 'Of an invasiDn 'Of the GDR, the West Ger-
man calculated risk tODk 'On a new dimens,ion. I t was still possible, 
however, to manufacture an incident and organize sufficient expres-
sions of discDntent instide the GDR to serve as a pretext for moving 
in "to rescue" t!he GD R popula1tion. If they could not count 'On 
full American military support, they could be confident that the 
Western occupation troops in West Berlin would not hinder any-
thing they m,ight do, and in addition, would be helpful in keeping 
open the corridors from West Germany to West Berlin-thDse 
"access rights" which all along have been indispensable for the 
transportatiDn of spies, proV'OCaJteurs, criminals, and arms. West 
Berlin, in point 'Of fact, is the keystone 'Of West German designs 
'On the GDR and points eastward, and the continued presence 'Of 
N.ATO occupation troops in West Berlin, requiring the indefinilte 
cDntinuation of "rights of access" to West Berl,in, is the granite 
core of that keystQne. 'Inerefore, even if Bonn's risk had been 
increased by the Kennedy position, it had not expanded tQ in-
surmountable odds, and Adenauer and Strauss reckoned that if 
the GD·R probe failed, the presence 'Of huge American, British and 
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French occupation troops in West Germany would help to deter 
a counter-blow. Until August 13, therefore, a West German strike 
at the GDR had not been ruled out. 
I t was ruled out by the wa.ll. The wall represented in no 
uncert'ain terms that a West German strike at the GDR could not 
succeed. But the wall also marked the culmination of a buildup 
of strength by the Warsaw Pact powers. It dramatized not only 
the GDR's intention and ability to repel an attack, but the inten-
tion and abiHty of the GD'R's allies to deliver a counter-blow 
whenever and wherever deemed necessary. The wall signified 
to the West German leaders that the ris'k was too high, for what 
they would be risking was their own physical existence. They did 
not 'wish to take "the final risk." Just as later, during the Cuban 
crisis, they were overjoyed at the prospect of an American-Soviet 
collision and rusked to goad President Kennedy on with a pledge 
of "support," so they would not have minded if Kennedy had tried 
to smash the wall. And Willy Brandt let the cat out of the bag 
in his letter to President Kennedy, a "mistake" for which he was 
severely rebuked by the tactful and careful Herr Strauss. 
One of the m'arvels of this entire sequence of events, which 
developed over a period of several months, is that most of us 
Americans knew nothing about ilt. Being journalists and fully 
aware of the obstacles to getting the real story about most im-
portant developments, we do not relish the term "conspiracy of 
silence" which is frequently tossed at our information media. Yet, 
in this sort of development, which could have placed the national 
security of the American people in jeopardy, Americans who knew 
what was going on apparently did not consider it necessary to in-
form the public. We got our first hint of what was at st:ake in the 
wall from the Bri tish, who paraded along Whitehall and around 
Trafalgar Square bearing signs that said: "Better wall than warl" 
Although the stage had been set to involve the United States as the 
main combatant against the Warsaw Pact countries, the British-
far more clearly than we-understood the consequences of such 
an involvement. Why? 
v. 
A "CONSPIRACY" OF SILENCE" 
When you mull these things ' over and do some home-<work in 
recent history, our present position in relation to Ger·many is likely 
to conjure up two ghosts from the past: Pearl Harbor and Munich. 
Let's face it! There Wlas no "conspiracy of silence" about the 
events that culminated in the wall; Americans who knew what was 
happening most probably did not see it as a danger to the A'meri-
can people. The Pearl Harbor inquiry established that OUY com-
manders in H 'awaii and the Philippines also saw what was hap-
pening, in fact, were informed of the posi tion and movemen ts of 
the Japanese fleet; but they simply did not see those movements 
as a threat to Pearl Harbor. We have already expressed our opin-
ion that the case of the West Ger.man leaders who ignore the 
determination of the 17 million East Germans to build socialism 
is N,OT a case of "none so blind as they who will not see," but 
a case of an inten tion to su bvert and destroy the reali ty they 
do see. The w.ise old saying was fully applicable at Pearl Harbor. 
We believe it is relevant also in respect to the wall. 
True, the owners of our media of information betray a self-
hypnosis concerning everything that happens in the area of East-
West relations. Despite the factual record they attribute all inci-
dents without exception to "the Communists," even to "the Krem-
lin." The Berlin "cl1ises" are invariably caused by "Communist 
machinations" or "Soviet intransigeance." So long and so assidu-
ously have they labored to construct this bogeyman that it is not 
illogical to think that they have come to look upon their- con-
trivance as reality. And although our policy-makers in Washing-
ton should and perhaps do see what is before their eyes, their 
long pre-occupation with the "Communist menace" and the "So-
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viet threat" has become a film tha't obscures and distorts their 
vIsion. 
In Potsdam, about an hour's drive from Berlin, the American 
tourist receives special attention. Particularly in the former manor 
house of the H0'henzollern prince, a charming place beside a small 
lake, are Ame~icans accorded a warm welcome. This was the 
scene of the Potsdam Conference of July 17 to August 2, 1945. 
iThe guides are delighted to lead Amerioans through this place, 
to point out the piano used by President Truman, the study of 
Churchill and, after his election defeat, of Attlee, the chair in 
which Stalin sat. And pointing to one of the small balconies that 
looked down on the conference table, she told us: "And there is 
where your President Kennedy sat. He was a newspaper corre-
spondent then." It was a reminder that President Kennedy is 
fully aware 0'f the agreement at Potsda,m t0' implement the agree-
ments at Yalta and Teher:an. These had, as their main content, 
the commitment of the Anglo-Soviet-American allies to collaborate 
in the destruction of German militarism both during the war and 
after. Expliciltly staJted also in these agreements was the commit-
ment to uproot and destroy nazism. Yet, t!he Kennedy AdmiIllis-
tration to date is implementing quite a different policy, the policy 
of rebuilding German militarism under leadership of ex-nazis as 
an instrument against socialism and our wartime ally. 
It is one of the great turn-abouts in history. For Americans 
wi th even a rudimentary know ledge of recent history m us t surely 
recall what happened during the war. A few years ago Adolf 
Heusinger was planning the death of every American within firing 
range. Now he silts in the Pentagon surrounded by boot-liclcing 
American generals. A few years ago our war crimes tribunals 
charged Hermann J. Abs, head of the Deutsche Bank, with having 
directed muoh of the looting of nazi-occupied Europe, in the role 
of a glorified German Al Capone. Today our biggest bankers, pub-
lishers and politicos-including Governor Nelson Rockefeller and 
Henry Luce-parade Abs around the country as a paragon of virtue 
and an oracle of truth. It is indeed unbelievable! 
Nevertheless, ilt is no secret that such things could and did 
happen. Most of us know that· a re-armed, ultra-reactionary 
Germany was deliberately re-established-mainly by our govern-
ment-as a "shield" against the socialist countries. The Germans 
were to "hold the line" while we, with our atom-bomb monopoly, 
were to be the "sword." We were told we had to have this "shield" 
because "the Communists" were threatening our very survival by 
trying to over~un all of Europe. We know today that this was 
all a gigantic fraud, but at that time we didn't stop to consider that 
the Soviets did not have the atom bomb, had just .fought four 
years of a war in which they had lost 30 million people and half 
of their induSltrial potential, and wanted nothing on earth S'O much 
as a chance to bury their dead, heal their wounded, and rebuild 
their devastated country. We fell for the cold war line then, and 
allowed the Dulles brothers, Dean Acheson, John J. McCloy, Gen-
eral Lucius Clay and other dollar patriots to take over. 
They took over completely. They scrapped Potsdam, Yalta and 
Teheran. They let the nazis out of prison and handed over $10 
billion of A'mer-iean taxpayers' money to ex-nazi bankers like 
Abs, and to war criminals Hke Flick, Thyssen and the I'G Farben 
gang. They set up the Adenauer government in the Federal Re-
public and split Germany into two staJtes. They drew the West 
German state into NATO and sped the re-arming of the German 
militarists, the restoration of German imperialism, and the return 
of the nazis to political power. 
Dulles, Acheson and company probably figured their gambit 
had won the game before it really began. The W'est Germans 
would grow strong enough to re-unite their country. They '\vould 
then-who knoV\Ts? But for Dulles, Acheson and their friends, the 
they were unable to do the job alone, if the "shield" faltered or was 
repelled, the American "sword" would join the fray. It would 
be the Germans who would take the brunt of the counter-blow, 
the Americans who would deliver the coup de grace. ' There were 
undoubtedly other calculations behind U.S. policy. People who 
sounded like patriotism incarnate in declaiming th.at "'we can'lt 
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do business with the Communists" showed no compunction what-
soever in doing business with men who Hmassed fortunes from 
the properties of six million murdered Jews. The most respectable 
American corporate heads locked arms with the most degenerate 
nazi thugs in a partnership to plunder first Germany, then Europe, 
then-who knows? But for Dulles, Acheson and their friends, the 
main aim was to use German blood and American machines for 
the final showdown with the Communists. As John Foster Dulles 
wrote in his book, War or Peace~ -the calculation of these American 
schemers was that by forcibly reuniting Ger.many and drawing the 
GDR into NAT'O, West Germany would gain an advanced strate-
gic position in Cen tral Europe which would undermine the Soviet 
position and the socialist military and political position in Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and other adjacent countries. 
This was not an original idea. Harry Truman w-anted to play 
the Germans off against the Soviets in 1941 after Hitler atitacked 
the Soviet Union. By helping tthe side which was losing, Truman 
said, America could let them kill each other off and then pick the 
bones of both corpses. That very idea was also the kernel of the 
"strategy" pursued by Neville Chamberlain and Edouard Dala-
dier as they led Britain and France down the road to Munich. 
The tragic irony of ilts adoption by the American policy .. makers 
lay in the fact that they behaved as if they enjoyed the monopoly 
of it. They acted as if the idea would never occur to the West 
Germans. 
The Germans behaved as might have been expected. They 
pledged allegiance to NATO. They virtually kissed the backsides 
of their filthy-rich, powerful uncle who so generously gave them a 
few bills from his fat wallet and in addition handed them a gun. 
And they solemnly vowed again and again and again that they 
would never, never break the peace-except against the Commu-
nists. This exception so delighted their paJtron that he gave them 
a free hand in their own country and in N'ATO; that is, in West-
ern Europe. Read the speeches of every West German spokesman 
who has come to the United States or spoken in Germany for 
international consumption and you will find these themes in-
v.ariably and repeatedly emphasized. Then examine the struc-
ture of the West German government and you will find all the 
major policy-m:aking offices in the Federal RepubHc occupied by 
ex-na~is and Hitler generals. Look at West Europe; you will see 
the Bundswehr where Hittler was unable to place them. 
Something else happened, too. The wheel has come full circle. 
The tail has come to wag the dog. The WeSit German leaders 
are no longer the "shield." They have become a "sword," and 
with nuclear ar,ms, they will be TH,E "s'word" of NATO and the 
Atlan tic Alliance. This was the lesson of the Berlin wall, when 
Adenauer and Brandt sought to. use Ameri'cans as their "shield." 
It is still the lesson Df West Berlin, where A1merican boys stand 
guard over the interests of the ex-nazis. 
If this lesson needs further study, one can reflect on the curtious 
falct that the policy of our government seems to be identical to the 
policy of the Wes t Gel1mlan leaders, indeed, is dictated by them. 
It may not be apparent to us, but sober-minded, responsible 
people in Briltain, France, I!taly, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the So-
viet Union, Norway, Denmark and other EurDpean countries 
simply do nOlt believe the Ruhr magnates and other powerful 
West German industrialtists will relinquish their claims to exploit 
the workers and to possess the plants, faotories, and lands ei ther 
in Berlin, both East and West, or in the German Democratic Re-
public, or in the countries east of the Oder-Neisse line. They do 
not bel,ieve that the Bonn poHticians will ever agree to recognize 
the frontier between East and West Berlin, or the sovereignty 
and authority of the GDR, or the permanence Df the Oder-Neisse 
frontier. They do nOlt believe that vhe German general staff w,ill 
discard their drea,ms of revenge, conquest and glory through an-
other war, and their schemes for obtaining the nuclear arms with 
which to wage it. They do not believe that a war kindled by this 
combination of Germ'an monopolists, miliJtarists and politicians, 
no mlatter whether a civil conflict or a small, local clash, can be 
prevented from escalating into. a world war. They do not believe 
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that if we Americans remain en tangled wi th these German mo-
nopolists, poJi.ticians and mil~tari'S ts, through N A TO and other 
ties formed by our bUSIiness leaders and politicians, that we can 
avoid being drawn into the conflict. 
Listen to General Luoius D. Clay setting forth the "basic com-
mitments which 1ve have made in Germany." The General, who 
funations also as a direotor of a number of corpollations, such 
as Continental Can, made ~hese remarks laSit June 18 at a New York 
dinner: 
"We have pledged ourselves in solemn language to protect 
West Berlin. We have defined this protection to include freedom 
of access by air for all and on the ground for the aBies; and to 
maintain the viability of West Berlin which includes freedom of 
access for persons and goods. We have promised to main~ain our 
troops in West B'erlin as long as its people want them. We have 
also stated that we are opposed to any lessening of the ties which 
now exist between Berlin and the Federal Republic. We are com-
mitted to the Federal Republic not to recognize the East German 
Government, but to continue to support the l1ight of the German 
people Ito deter,mine themselves in free elections the kind of gov-
ernment under which they want to li've. We have also stated that 
the final boundary lines of the new Gelimany oan not be deter-
mined until there is a single German governm·ent. These are the 
bas,ic principles from which we can not devia!te ... and ,vhich vve 
are prepared to defend with all the strengtJh at our disposal." 
Is this an American speaking? It is hard to believe. What 
springs to mind is not that Clay hi'mself has written in his book 
Decision in Germany that "nothing w'as agreed upon" by the four 
victor powers "that guaranteed a right of access nor were particu-
l,ar righ ts gran ted on the roads, on the railroads or in the air" to 
Berlin from West Germany. What strikes the eye is Clay's com-
plete identification of the interests of the American people with 
those of the West German monopolists, milital1ists and politicians. 
They want the factories and plants of WeSlt Berlin protected in 
the expectation of again o,vning and controlling them. Clay 
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says "we" have pledged to protect them. They want access routes 
to West Berlin kept open for the tran~port of agents, spies, crimi-
nals, money, goods and, when the time comes, troops for the 
"unification" of Germany. Clay says "we" have pledged to keep 
them open. 
vhey want Amer-ioan occupation troops to stay as the "shield" 
they need toO draw America and the Soviet Union into mutual an-
nihilation, after which their "sword" will be supreme. Clay says 
"we" will maintain our troops there. 
They want no recognition of the German Democratic Republic. 
Clay says H'we" will not recognize it. 
They want no recognition of the Oder-Neisse frontiers. Clay 
says "we" will not recognize them. 
And, says Clay, "we" intend to stand by these com-mitments 
with all the strength at our disposal, that is, ait the risk of na-
tional suicide. 
From this it can be seen that General Clay could not more 
f~i~hfully represent the interests of the West German monopolists 
and miHtarists were he one of them. He has passed off as "our" 
policy, that is, the policy of the A'merican people, a policy in no 
iota different from the pollicy of Adenauer and Strauss, Krupp and 
A,bs, Speidel and Heusinger. In all of his remarks, the one basic 
fact he neglected to mention was what vital American interest 
is being protected by our West Berlin garrison of 6,000 ,men, our 
West German occupation force of about 200,000 troops! The 
reason for Clay'S omission is simple: there ·is no vital American 
national interest either in a West Berlin that remains -the tinder-
box of a new conflagr ation, nor in a West German state intent 
on putting sparks to the "inflammables in that tinder .. box. The 
paramount, over-riding Ameri()an national interest, to which all 
other national interests are subordinate, lies in peace-a peaceful 
solution of the proble-m of '''Test Berlin and ,the problem of 
Germany. 
For the protection of American national interests, we require 
an American policy, not a 'German policy, and especially noOt a 
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policy corresponding to the aims and needs of !the ,mos t reactionary 
oircles in Ge,rmany. How 'can American national interests be pro-
tected by a nazi policy? 
We repeat, the true vital American national interest, that is, the 
true interest of the overwhel,ming majority 'Of the people who 
make up the American nation, requires stability and peace in 
Europe. Wi,th West German militarization almost completed, it 
is already very late to act for European stability. The wily men 
of Bonn, flattering the megalomanic De Gaulle, have already be-
gun the creation of an alliance with which Ito dominate Western 
Europe and determine the course 'Of NATO. Neither the Ruhr 
kings nor the French money-bags have undying affection for the 
United States. To provoke a general conflagration in the hope of 
comling out alive on top of lthe heaIp of corpses requires no more 
military pow'er than they presently command. All it takes is an 
incident that will embroil AmeJ'ica with the Soviet Union-an in-
cident that can be manufaotured any day of the 'week in West 
Berlin. 
'Dhe true vital American national interests requires a new ap-
proach to ,the Soviet Union and the socialist world. I t requires 
not merely coexistence with the Soviet Union, not merely an armed 
truce, but cooperation in achieving Sltability in central Europe. 
For 17 years now the policy of 'building up Germany as an anti-
Soviet and anti-,Communist military force has benefitted no one 
but the mortal enemies of the Amer~can people and the handful 
of Americans who make money on it. And it has brought us far 
down the road to another Munich-to another Munich in the 
nuclear age! 
The Soviets have again invited us, have implored us in fact, 
to participate with them and other intereSited states in elimina;ting 
the conditions through which the W es t Germans hope to set off 
an American-Soviet clash. That means solving the problem of 
West Berlin, the problem of ~he GDR-FRG frontier, the question 
of the Oder-Neisse border. The reasonableness of the Soviets in 
respect to the Cuban crisis and K.hrushchev's renewed appeal for 
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negotiation on the other outstanding questions suggests that a 
new effort to resolve the problem of Berlin can succeed. 
Regardless of whether Adenauer and De Gaulle or anyone else 
opposes it-and Bonn and Paris are certain to oppose it-we be-
lieve our government should accept this invitation. We believe 
our acceptance would conform to the true national intereSits of the 
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